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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND FEDERAL
SECURITIES REGULATION: RECONCILING TWO CONFLICTING
POLICIES

Kanji ISHIZUMI

*

1. Introduction
The recent dramatic increase in international investment transactions involving U.S. citizens [1] has exposed a clash of two national policies regarding
dispute resolution. The U.S. securities laws contain certain provisions which
prohibit the waiver of their protections [2]. At the same time, the U.S. Congress
[3] and courts [4] have recognized the benefits of international commercial
arbitration, even though its use may interfere with, or create results different
from, potential resolutions under the aforementioned securities laws. This
article explores developments in and current problems of the implementation
and reconciliation of these two policies.

2. Policy for international commercial arbitration
2.1. Development of internationalcommercial arbitration
To bring suit and obtain judgment in a foreign country is expensive,
time-consuming, and complicated. By contrast, international commercial arbitration can be a straightforward, economical, informal, and impartial means of
resolving international business disputes. Arbitration offers benefits to businesspersons and taxpayers alike. "Not only does [arbitration] relieve the congestion in the courts, but it relieves the taxpayer from assessment for additional
facilities. In other words, business taxes itself to pay the cost of keeping
commercial peace" [5]. Those engaging in international commerce generally
prefer arbitration over litigation [6]. Indeed, arbitration has been considered
virtually indispensable for multinational corporations [7].
Arbitration systems have advanced remarkably during the last half century.
Almost every developed nation has established some kind of arbitral body for
*
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commercial disputes [8]. In addition, private organizations such as trade
associations and commodity exchanges have offered facilities for arbitration of
commercial disputes relating to specific commodities [9]. International efforts
to increase the use of arbitration have resulted in mechanisms such as intergovernmental agreements and private international organizations, through
which international commercial arbitration has acquired a more solid legal
standing [10].
Early significant developments in multilateral mechanisms were the 1923
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses [11] and the 1927 Geneva Convention
on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards [12]. Although these two Geneva
treaties "did not live up to the expectations of those who had viewed them as a
decisive step in the progress of the international commercial arbitration" [13],
they were obviously a positive step.
More recent multilateral efforts promoting international arbitration have
included the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (CSID) [14], the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATI) [15], the European Convention for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes [16], the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (U.N. Convention) [17], the European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 [18], and the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission in International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) [19].
Along with these governmental efforts, the international business community has set up its own private organizations for dispute settlement. The
International Chamber of Commerce with its Court of Arbitration is the most
successful of these [20]. Founded in 1919, the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) has stated that "the advantages to the business world of an
international organization for the settlement of business disputes of an
international character without recourse to the formalities of court proceed-.
ings, are such that the International Chamber of Commerce feels in duty
bound to do everything in its power to encourage conciliation and trbitration
[sic]" [21].
Since the ICC's inception, over 2,000 disputes have been submitted to it
[22]. In order to realize fair and equitable dispute resolution, the ICC's Court
of Arbitration has undertaken to ensure that proper arbitrators are chosen for
each case. The Court does not itself appoint individual arbitrators, but rather
selects "a national committee or committees which it considers strategically
located for making the best arbitration proposal in the case cQncerned" [23].
The Court has approved of arbitrators selected from the ranks of diplomats,
high level public servants, engineers, university professors, bankers, and industrialists, in addition to members of the legal profession. Further, the ICC
adopts reasonable and careful procedures in choosing the place of arbitration
[24]. Thus, as far as international commercial disputes are concerned, the ICC

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol6/iss1/3

K. Islnzuni / Internationalcommercialarbitration

may be considered no less capable than a domestic judicial system in its ability
to arrive at a fair and equitable award which is based on the realities of
international commerce [25].
In most cases the ICC arbitration awards have been voluntarily carried out
[26]. In the event of non-compliance, the party seeking the enforcement has
recourse to the courts of any nation in which the losing party has assets. In
most cases, judgment can be obtained without a rehearing of the merits of the
dispute [27].
2.2. The United States' attitude toward internationalefforts for utilizing international commercial arbitration- before ratification of the U.N. Convention
Early common law doctrine in England and the United States was antagonistic toward commercial arbitration [28]. U.S. legislators overturned that
doctrine, and recognized arbitration as a dispute settlement system equal to the
judicial system, by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) [29]
and various state laws dating as far back as 1921 [30]. The FAA declares that
agreements to arbitrate are valid, enforceable, and irrevocable. The FAA also
provides for the stay of court proceedings pending arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements in the federal courts [31].
The United States originally shunned multilateral efforts to establish international commercial arbitration, preferring to move more cautiously through
limited arbitration clauses in bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (TFCN) [32]. The United States did not join in the multilateral
Geneva treaties of 1923 and 1927 and it was not until 1946 that the United
States launched its first bilateral effort, a TFCN with China [33]. Far from
liberal in its endorsement of commercial arbitration, the arbitration clause
provided that an agreement to arbitrate would be given full faith and credit,
but that an award would be recognized only in the territory in which it was
rendered [34]. The TFCN with Ireland in 1950 [35] was only slightly more
progressive: it prohibited a state from denying effect to an award solely on the
basis that it was rendered outside the territory of that state, but allowed that
other factors could defeat its enforcement [36]. TFCNs with Colombia, Denmark, Haiti, Israel, and Korea followed [37]. TFCNs concluded with Japan
[38] and West Germany [39] in the early 1950s contained considerably liberalized arbitration clauses, but it was not until 1956, in its TFCN with the
Netherlands [40], that the United States had a full-fledged arbitration clause.
The TFCN with the Netherlands goes beyond "the principle of non-discrimination" and makes foreign awards "conclusive!' in enforcement proceedings before the courts of either party. Thus, it imposes a duty to enforce such
awards [41].
In support of the United States' bilateral approach, commentators have
stated that "bilateral treaties can handle problems peculiar to two trading
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partners better than broad multilateral agreements in which various states have
differing problems and in which a least common denominator approach must
be utilized" [42]. Whatever the United States' reasons for pursuing bilateral
arbitration clauses and eschewing multilateral agreements, U.S. courts have not
hesitated to recognize and enforce foreign awards under, and even beyond, the
coverage of TFCN arbitration clauses [43].
2.3. The U.N Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral
Awards: A broad change in U.S. nationalpolicy
2.3.1. The adoption of the U.N. Convention
As international business transactions increased after World War II, the
international community urgently needed a new multilateral convention on
international arbitration. The 1958 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, in which the United States and forty-four other
nations participated, adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. It was signed by twenty-five of the participants, and entered into force on June 7, 1959 [44].
The international community clearly established, in the form of a legal
agreement, its approval of arbitration. The United States, however, "[d]ue to
an obsolete misunderstanding of arbitration ...remained largely in the
background" [45] and for twelve years refused to join the U.N. Convention.
Among the reasons offered for the United States' recalcitrance were: "(1) The
[U.N.] convention embodies principles of arbitration law which would not be
desirable for the United States to endorse; and (2) The United States lacks a
sufficient legal basis for acceptance of an advanced international convention
on this subject matter" [46]. The fact that the United States accepted arbitration agreements only through reciprocal bilateral TFCNs suggests that the
self-defensive instinct rooted in the common law's hostility to arbitration was
an underlying element of its refusal to add its support to that of the international community.
2.3.2. The U.N. Convention
The U.N. Convention improves upon the 1927 Geneva Convention in many
respects. Article I of the U.N. Convention has a wider definition of enforceable
awards [47]. Article II precludes the courts of Contracting States from deciding
a controversy covered by a valid arbitration clause, whether it is an agreement
to arbitrate existing disputes or future controversies, unless the agreement
concerns a subject matter incapable of settlement by arbitration [48]. Article V
2(a) establishes that such incapacity is to be determined by the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought, under
the law of that country. To promote international uniformity and encourage
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arbitration, it is expected that each country's authority will adopt similar
standards of arbitrability [49].
Article 11(3) deals with the "Stay of Litigation". The most crucial issue here
is which law decides whether the arbitration agreement is "null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed". The first choice appropriately is
given to the parties who can specify the governing law. Absent such a
specification, the court of the forum state will decide the issue on the basis of
its own law and policy, including its own rules on conflict of laws [50].
Article III is the most basic provision of the U.N. Convention. It states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon. under the conditions
laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which
this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral
awards.

The second sentence of this Article simplifies the requirements with which the
party seeking recognition of an award would have had to comply under the
Geneva Convention [51].
Article V is the most controversial provision. It provides the ground for the
refusal to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. By placing the burden
of proof on the party against whom recognition or enforcement is invoked,
Article V departs from the Geneva Convention provision under which the
plaintiff had to bear the burden. A further difference (from the Geneva
Convention is that the U.N. Convention allows a court to refuse enforcement
only on one of the grounds specified in the Convention. Article V provides
seven grounds for refusal, including: (1) incapacity of the parties or invalidity
of the arbitration agreement (validity of an agreement is examined under the
law which the parties have specified, and the law of the country where the
award was made governs when there is no such indication by the parties); (2)
the lack of proper notice; (3) awards exceeding the scope of arbitration
agreements; (4) inproprieties in the arbitral procedure or composition of the
arbitral authority; and (5) awards not binding or set aside or suspended by a
competent authority.
The sixth and seventh grounds for refusal are stated in Article V(2):
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) the subject
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country;
or (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.

It has been pointed out that applying domestic standards of arbitrability on
international awards poses unduly complicated legal questions [52] and dis-
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courages the use of international arbitration. In addition, as one commentator
concisely suggested: "provision [(a)] is unnecessary because, if the matter
under dispute sharply conflicts with strong local policies it could better be
handled under the 'public policy' language of this section" [53].
Paragraph (b) effectively relegates final authority over the reach of the U.N.
Convention to the good faith of the Contracting States. Obviously, it is
expected that Contracting States will not abuse the public policy defense. To
give a broad definition to "public policy" in order to protect national interests
would eviscerate the Convention.
The remaining sixteen articles in the U.N. Convention deal mainly with
procedural matters.
2.3.3. United States' accession and implementing legislation
As international transactions increased, support for accession to the U.N.
Convention began to grow in the United States. This support was voiced by
private organizations such as the American Bar Association, the American
Arbitration Association, and the United States Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce, as well as by the American business community.
Influenced by the growing support, President Lyndon Johnson urged the
Senate to reconsider the U.N. Convention [54]. On October 4, 1968, the Senate
consented to accession, by a vote of 57-0. When the implementing legislation
was signed into law on July 31, 1970, the United States became the Convention's thirty-seventh Contracting State.
That implementing legislation is the new Chapter 2 of the FAA, which is
entitled "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards" [55]. Its provisions are briefly summarized below.
Section 201 declares that the United States is under an obligation to enforce
the U.N. Convention, while section 202 defines the agreements or awards
which fall within the Convention. Basically, section 202 provides that arty
arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of foreign commerce falls
under the Convention. It should be noted that even "[a]n agreement or award
arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the
United States" [56] falls under the Convention, provided that the legal relationship "involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states" [57]. The philosophy of the section is to apply the Convention as
broadly as possible. The "reasonable relationship" criteria should be decided
pursuant to this philosophy [58].
Sections 203 to 205 deal with procedural matters, such as jurisdiction and
venue [59]. Section 207 provides that a court may direct that arbitration be
held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for,
whether the place is within or without the United States. The court may also
appoint arbitrators and has discretion to order arbitration in the United States.
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(The spirit of the Convention requires that the scope of this discretion should
be narrowly construed.) Section 207 also contains provisions relating to orders
confirming an award.
2.3.4. Change of nationalpolicy
The U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention signified a fundamental departure from the predominantly negative view of international commercial arbitration which had prevailed in federal courts. The nation finally viewed the
benefits of predictability and uniformity of award enforcement throughout the
world as outweighing its traditional reluctance to enforce decisions made
beyond its territory. The Supreme Court viewed the principal purpose underlying the United States' accession to the U.N. Convention as one:
To encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries [60].

The Court also made it clear that federal courts are to recognize this policy in
their judgments:
Courts of signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should
not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their
desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements 161].

3. Policy for federal securities regulation
In the interest of preserving investors' rights under U.S. law, federal courts
have extended the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. securities laws and have
developed a policy disfavoring the arbitration of securities disputes. This
obviously clashes with the federal policy which now favors commercial arbitration.
3.1. Extraterritorialapplicabilityof federal securities laws
The reach of U.S. securities laws is a subject of dispute, within the U.S.
judicial system, as well as in the international community. Section 30(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act states:
The provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person
insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless
he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.

In the first case dealing with extraterritorial application of the Exchange
Act, Kook v. Crang (1960), the district court took a narrow view of its
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jurisdiction: "It is a canon of construction that legislation of Congress, unless
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States" [62]. Later courts have taken a somewhat less
narrow view and found jurisdiction where the substantial course of the
conduct alleged to be a violation of the securities laws occurred within the
territory of the United States [63].
Some courts, however, have expanded the extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws by employing what may be called the "adverse impact
test". This test allows courts to find jurisdiction if there is an adverse impact
on U.S. investors or markets, regardless of whether the substantial course of
the conduct at issue occurred within the territory of the United States [64]. It
may be noted that this test ignores the adverse effect on the citizens and
markets of other nations caused by such findings of jurisdiction and extraterritorial applications of U.S. laws.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the "adverse impact test"
in its decision in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook (1969) [65], a derivative action
brought by a U.S. shareholder of a Canadian corporation listed on the
American Stock Exchange. The court found that sales of the Canadian
corporation's treasury stock made in Canada to the defendant Canadian
corporation were in violation of the Securities Exchange Act section 19(b) and
SEC Rule lOb-5. The court dxplained:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American Exchanges and
to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in
American securities (66].

The court did not consider that "[u]nlimited reach of American securities law
would lead to 'inconsistent obligation, multiple liability, and unpredictability'
and would be an affront to foreign countries" [67]. Subsequent courts, even
when finding jurisdiction based upon the existence of acts committed within
the territorial boundaries of the United States, have continued to refer to and
affirm the validity of "the adverse impact test" [68].
Courts have applied securities laws extraterritorially even where the acts
occurring within the United States were insignificant or non-essential to the
violation and where the impact of the defendant's action or omissions has been
insubstantial. One court has held that the adverse impact need be to a
particular protected individual and not generally to the American market or
investor [69]. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd. (1973) [70], the court found
extraterritorial application appropriate because there was an "impact", however slight, on U.S. investors or markets. Subject matter jurisdiction was based
upon the foreign defendant's use of interstate communication facilities of the
United States, although he was not physically present in the country. The court
stated that jurisdiction was not lost even where "some significant steps in the
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fraudulent scheme took place in Canada" and even when "the securities were
foreign securities neither registered nor traded on an organized United States
market" [71].
In light of the frequent and active business relationship between the United
States and Canada, it may be concluded that, under the Travis test, Canadian
corporations and citizens are generally subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. The Travis court did not consider whether Canada could tolerate such
parochial extension of U.S. jurisdiction and not all commentators share the
court's view that this extension was indeed intended by Congress [72].By
adopting the "adverse impact test", the courts have extended their jurisdiction
only for the purpose of protecting U.S. investors and markets. This nationalism appears clearly in the cases where plaintiffs are non-resident foreigners. In
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc. [73] a class action was brought by U.S. citizens
resident in the United States and abroad and by foreigners residing abroad.
The court denied jurisdiction only as to the foreign plaintiffs. The court found
that as to the resident Americans, "the dispatch from abroad of misleading
statements to the United States" is sufficient to uphold jurisdiction [74],
whereas for the foreigners residing abroad such activities are not sufficient.
The court's opinion also states: "While merely preparatory activities in the
United States are not enough to trigger application of the securities laws for
injury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to
Americans so resident" [75].
Through its laws a nation attempts to extend its reach as far as possible,
even beyond its territorial limits, in order to protect itself from unwanted
influence from abroad and to complete its capacity to enforce laws and policies
binding within its own domain [76]. This attempt is quite understandable in
light of the fact that domestic lawmaking is the exercise of a nation's sovereignty
necessary to the attainment of security, integrity, and independence. This is
particularly true of federal laws which are promulgated to realize basic policies
of a nation. To this end laws often involve: (1)prohibition of forum selection,
(2) prohibition of the choice of applicable law, (3) prohibition of arbitration
(nonarbitrability), and (4) extraterritorial application. In the area of international business disputes nonarbitrability, in particular, has served to bolster the
protections of U.S. citizens and policies inherent in the other three categories.
It should be borne in mind, however, that, despite their self-protective
advantages, overzealous pursuit of the benefits of extraterritorial application of
domestic law and refusal to enforce foreign judicial or extrajudicial awards
also brings disadvantages. No nation can "have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on her terms, governed by her
laws, and resolved in her courts" [77]. In the words of Justice Frankfurther in
Lauritzen v. Larsen:
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[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the necessity for mutual
forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which we hold
sufficient to warrant application of our laws to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a
warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American transaction [78].

3.2. Nonarbitrabilityoffederal securities issues: The Wilko doctrine
Arguments favoring the nonarbitrability of federal securities disputes arise
from concern that an agreement to arbitrate made at the beginning of a
securities transaction may dilute the effectiveness of the substantive and
procedural protections created by the federal securities laws. These laws
provide virtually absolute liability in some cases and limit available defenses in
others [79]. Some provisions substantially reduce the burden on the plaintiff
[80]. In addition, federal courts have developed implied remedies, such as the
private right of action under section 10(b), for violations of federal statutes. In
addition, procedural advantages available to plaintiffs in federal courts may
not be available in arbitral tribunals. The extensive pretrial discovery privileges
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the wide choice of venue and
nationwide service of process provided by the Securities Exchange Act are
examples of procedural benefits not available to parties in arbitration.
Furthermore, it.may be argued that foreign arbitrators are not familiar with
the complicated system of U.S. securities regulation and may improperly
interpret relevant sections and protections of the federal statutes. In addition,
as arbitrators are not required to follow precedents and because an arbitral
award may be made without a complete record of proceedings, the arbitrators'
application of legal concepts such as "burden of proof", "reasonable care", or
"material fact" cannot be re-examined and reviewed.
Wilko v. Swan [81] is the leading Supreme Court case affirming the
nonarbitrability of securities disputes. The Court's decision was based on the
balancing of two conflicting Congressional policies: the policy favoring international commercial arbitration, demonstrated in the enactment of the FAA,
and the policy favoring extraordinarily strong investor protection, embodied in
the Securities Act of 1933.
First, the Court recognized that the FAA established the desirability of
arbitration as an alternative to the complexities of litigation, "if the parties are
willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment" [82]. Then the
Court discussed the Congressional policy behind the Securities Act, finding
that in order to protect investors, Congress had adopted disclosure as the Act's
major underpinning. To effect this approach, section 12 created a special right
to recover for misrepresentation which differs substantially from the common
law action in that the seller is made to assume the "burden of proving lack of
scienter" [83]. Congress deemed the disparity of access to information between
securities investors and issuers and dealers to be much greater than that
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between ordinary contracting parties. "When the securities buyer, prior to any
violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in court, he gives up
more than would a participant in other business transactions" [84] he surrenders one of the privileges the Act gives him at "a time when he is less able
to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his
adversary" [85). Finally, the Court pointed out the inappropriateness of the
arbitration process for securities disputes, expressing concern that the arbitrators' decisions may be arbitrary in examining the subjective aspects of the case
[86]. From this reasoning the Court found that the policy of the federal
securities laws outweighs that of the FAA and concluded that the arbitration
agreement was a "stipulation" waiving "compliance with" the provision of the
Securities Act, contrary to section 14 of the Act, and was, therefore, void [87].
The influence of the Supreme Court's holding in Wilko has been substantial.
The Wilko doctrine has been applied to suits under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 [88]. In Starkman v. Seroussi, the customer of a securities
broker-dealer commenced an action to recover damages for violations of the
1933 and 1934 Acts. The defendant demanded that the claims be arbitrated in
accordance with the margin agreement. The district court, in granting plaintiff's
motion for a stay of arbitration, held: "Plaintiff ...has 'the right to select the
judicial forum' in which to prosecute his suit and, in view of section 29 of the
Exchange Act, cannot be compelled to submit his claim to arbitration" [89].
The Second Circuit in Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co. made a similar decision
[90]. In 1976, the Third Circuit, in Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., applied Wilko to a Rule lOb-5 dispute [91], as did the
Seventh Circuit in Weissbuch v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have emphasized the preeminent role of the
federal courts in securities disputes [92]. Recently, for example, the Seventh
Circuit in Dickinson o. Heinold Securities, Inc. reiterated that "a federal court
has the sole right to decide the ultimate issues essential to a federal securities
law claim" [93]. Both courts, however, along with a number of others, have
continued to keep in mind that the Wilko doctrine is a balancing test. The
Weissbuch opinion affirmed the Wilko doctrine while accenting its balancing
test foundation, saying: "We ...continue to adhere to our belief that policy
considerations mandate the application of Wilko to Rule lOb-5 situations
absent the presence of international concerns" [941. The Fifth Circuit in
Sawyer v. Raymond, James and Associates, Inc. (securities brokerage firm
moving for stay pending arbitration) stated: "With only a minor exception of
international securities transactions, the Wilko rule remains the law" [95]. In
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball and Turben, the Sixth Circuit held that the
"arbitration agreement is overridden by the anti-waiver provisions of the
federal securities laws", pointing out that domestic securities issues do "not
come within the narrow exception to Wilko for cases concerning international
securities transactions" [961. A number of other federal statutory claims have
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been exempted from pre-dispute arbitration agreements and have proceeded
through the judicial system on the basis of the Wilko doctrine [97].

3.3. Should the Wilko doctrine be upheld?

3.3.1. Doubts about the Wilko doctrine
Whether continued adherence to the Wilko doctrine is reasonable should be
critically examined. Its rationale is questionable in light of the federal policy
for arbitration. In the Wilko case itself two Justices dissented, stating: "advantages [provided by the FAA] should be be assumed to be denied in
controversies ...arising under the Securities Act, in the absence of any
showing that settlement by arbitration would jeopardize the rights of the
plaintiff" [98]. Arbitration agreements can be void only when "the plaintiff in
opening an account had no choice but to accept the arbitration stipulation,
thereby making the stipulation an unconscionable and unenforceable provision
in a business transaction" [99]. They clearly concluded that the anti-waiver
provision of the Securities Act is not a general limitation on the FAA. The
voidability of an arbitration agreement should be decided on a case-by-case
scrutiny under the contract'law prohibition of unconscionability, thus significantly increasing the possibility that an arbitration agreement would be held
enforceable.
For the purpose of deterrent effect, there is little difference between an
arbitral award and a court's judgment. Had Congress intended to foreclose the
option of arbitration, it could have been more explicit in its opposition toward
it in the securities laws. Counterweighting this silence, Congress has expressly
embraced the desirability of delegating some measure of the judicial system's
deterrent function to private citizens by enacting the FAA. To be consistent
with this shift in policy, federal courts should admit whatever dispute settlement mechanism citizens may choose: mediation conciliation, arbitration, or
direct negotiation.
Why is a private party not free to surrender an advantage established by
federal secruties law? The Wilko court states: "He ...surrenders it at a time
when he is less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act
places upon his adversary" [100]. This is, however, a fictitious assumption. The
parties can at least approximately predict the amount of damage which may be
caused in relation to that transaction and the statutes clearly indicate what the
handicap upon one's adversary is. It is also clear that no provision in the
federal securities law requires a defrauded party to sue. Does the Wilko
doctrine go too far, reading in a policy argument, without express statutory
language supporting it, which overrides the clearly established policy of the
FAA?
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3.3.2. Erosion of the Wilko doctrine
The Wilko doctrine has been eroded by cases in which courts have been
receptive to stock exchange arbitration, where stock exchange members are
deemed to have equal bargaining power. Arbitration agreements under the
authority of a constitution of a stock exchange have been held enforceable. The
Second Circuit in Axelrod v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, in which a non-member broker-dealer argued that he could compel a member of the New York
Stock Exchange to submit to the arbitration required by the NYSE rules,
states: "[T]he policy considerations relied on by the Supreme Court in Wilko
are inapposite here. ... [T]he legislative policy of protecting investors will not
be thwarted by compelling an exchange member to arbitrate ... " [101]. The

district court in Brown v. Gilligan explained that "it was assumed that dealers
could fend for themselves

... " [102]. Similarly, when the officers of a

broker-dealer claimed that they had been defrauded in their purchase of a
stock in the brokerage house, the New York Appellate Division in
McDonnell& Co. v. Cohig [103] held that the claims were subject to compulsory arbitration in accordance with the constitution of the NYSE. The
Second Circuit in Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich& Co. further eroded the Wilko
doctrine by granting a motion to stay pending arbitration of a claim based on
section 10(b) of the Securities Act [104]. More recently, the Fifth Circuit in
Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co. [105] applied Coenen to an action based on sections
12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act and sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act.
"[T]here have been important developments ... since ... Wilko v. Swan.
... One is the 'increasingly strong endorsement' which the policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes by arbitration has received" [106]. It is now
generally understood that "Wilko ... does not create a flat proscription against
the resolution of all securities laws claims by arbitration" [107].
Erosion of the Wilko doctrine in another context has also been based on
"bargaining power" considerations. In Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, an
action for rescission of a purchase agreement and damages against corporations and individuals mainly on the basis of Rule lOb-5,the court in dictum
questioned the applicability of the Wilko doctrine when parties have equal
bargaining power. First, the court interpreted the Wilko doctrine [108].
Wilko v. Swan ... involved individual customers suing large brokerage houses. IN]one of these
transactions was conducted at arm's length; rather, the customer had no choice but to sign the
forms in order to effectuate a purchase. Undoubtedly Congress intended to protect these investors
against the misuse of such uneven bargaining power.

The court concluded that the instant plaintiff and defendants were "both
sophisticated parties" and, under these circumstances, it was not convinced
that the arbitration provision was void [109].
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Because arbitration procedures are no less effective in protecting weak
investors, only an imbalance of bargaining power so great as to make the
agreement unconscionable should be considered reason to declare an arbitration agreement void and unenforceable.
4. Balancing two conflicting federal policies
4.1. The impact of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. [111], the Supreme Court reconciled two
conflicting federal policies: the principle, embodied in Wilko, of protecting
investors by preserving their litigation rights, and the policy in favor of
arbitration of international commercial disputes. The reasoning and result of
Scherk recognized the negative consequences of voiding arbitration clauses, but
the Court's failure to rely upon the Convention has unfortunately set a lasting
precedent for cases which should be governed by the Convention. The Court
merely weighed the conflicting U.S. policies in the specific factual context of
the case to reach its conclusions that the arbitration clause was enforceable,
even though the contract concerned securities.
The Scherk case arose when Alberto-Culver, an American corporation,
initiated a Rule lOb-5 action in Illinois federal district court. Alberto-Culver
had purchased trademark rights and foreign corporations organized under the
laws of Germany and Liechtenstein and owned by Scherk, a German citizen.
The contract provided that "any controversy or claim" would be referred to
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and
selected Illinois law as the governing law [1121. When Alberto-Culver discovered that the trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances, it
commenced a lOb-5 action, relying on the Wilko doctrine to void the arbitration agreement. Pursuant to the agreement and citing the Convention, Scherk
moved for a stay pending arbitration, which the Supreme Court eventually
granted [113].
In Scherk, the Court found support in its earlier decision enforcing a
choice-of-forum clause in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company [1141. The
Scherk majority reasoned that an agreement to arbitrate before a specified
tribunal is, in effect, "a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits
not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the
dispute" [115].
In The Bremen, Zapata Off-Shore Company, an American corporation, had
initiated a suit in admiralty in federal district court despite the parties' earlier
agreement upon a choice-of-forum clause which specified that disputes would
be litigated in London. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the forum selection clause was unenforceable [116]. Both courts relied
upon the traditional doctrine that a forum-selection clause will be respected
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only if the designated state is a more convenient forum than the state where
suit is brought.
The Supreme Court enforced the clause, stating that the growing involvement of Americans in international commerce mandated the abandonment of
the concept that all disputes must be resolved under American laws and in
American courts [117]. The The Bremen opinion concluded: "in the light of
present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade ... the
forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
aside" [118]. The Court reasoned:
[Manifestly) much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit
could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or ifjurisdiction were left
to any place where [personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established]. The elimination of all
such uncertainties by agreement in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an
indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting [1 19.

The parties in The Bremen had not designated the law to be applied, though
choice-of-forum clauses are often accompanied by choice-of-law provisions.
The Supreme Court found that British conflict of laws rules would determine
what law to apply [120], and that "it is the general rule in English courts that
the parties are assumed, absent contrary indication, to have designated the
forum with the view that it should apply its own law" [121]. This view of the
forum clause as a tacit designation of the rules and procedures to be applied to
the dispute supported the Scherk conclusion that an arbitration clause is a
specialized form of forum-selection clause [122].
To balance the arbitration policy with that of protection for the securities
investor, the Scherk Court considered the number of "international elements"
involved in the case. If the contract is sufficiently "international", the policy
for international commercial arbitration will dominate and the Wilko doctrine
will not be invoked. The Court found important international elements in the
Scherk case. Scherk was a German citizen; the negotiation and closing of the
contract were principally in Europe; and "most significantly, the subject
matter of the contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organized
under the laws of and primarily situated in European countries, whose activities were largely, if not entirely, directed to European markets" [123]. These
international elements were sufficient to justify an exception to Wilko.
The Wilko case was distinguished further: while that decision had treated
choice of forum as a valuable protection for the securities purchaser, in the
international context this advantage is illusory because "an opposing party
may by speedy resort to a foreign court block or hinder access to the
American court of the purchaser's choice" [124]. Furthermore, "[a] parochial
refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration
agreement ...[invites] unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. ... [S]uch a legal no-man's-land
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would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade ... "
[125]. In an international contract, the Court concluded, "[t]o determine that
'American standards of fairness' [citation omitted] must nonetheless govern the
controversy demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and
unnecessarily exalts the primacy of the United States law over the laws of other
countries" [126].
4.2. Criticism of the Scherk approach
The Scherk approach is inappropriate in two ways. First, its "international
elements" test could allow courts to refuse enforcement of international
arbitration agreements which are not sufficiently international to be exempted
from the Wilko doctrine. Second, the Court did not discuss the U.N. Convention.
4.2.1. The sufficiency of internationalelements
The Scherk Court thought that predictability was a desirable element in
international transactions. The Court states that an agreement on choice of
forum and governing law is "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to international business
transactions" [127]. The Scherk approach itself, however, could create unpredictability in international commerce. Both foreign and American businessmen
find it difficult to predict with confidence the weight or proportion of
international elements which render an arbitration agreement enforceable,
since the scale of "international elements" is not a well-defined criterion.
The Wilko doctrine could be invoked despite the existence of an international arbitration agreement if the- American court found international elements so minimal that the policy for protection of the securities purchasers
would apply, rather than the policy for international commercial arbitration.
As the Scherk opinion noted, "situations may arise where the contacts with
foreign countries are so insignificant or attenuated that the holding in Wilko
would meaningfully apply" [128]. Due to the importance of the matter, the
Court continued, a clearer criterion of judgment "should await future litigation
in concrete cases" [129].
The "concrete cases" decided in the years since Scherk reveal a fairly
consistent interpretation of this exception to the Wilko doctrine. In 1974, a
Texas district court characterized Scherk: "That case simply carved out a
narrow exception to the Wilko holding, and is applicable only to international
transactions" [130]. Three years later, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Scherk
as an exception to Wilko dependent upon the presence of international
elements [131]. In 1979, the Sixth Circuit described Scherk as a "narrow
exception to Wilko for cases concerning international securities transactions"
[132], and the Fifth Circuit recently termed it "only a minor exception [to
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Wilko] for international securities transactions" [133]. Although it remains
open, the Scherk loophole for "insignificant" foreign contacts in securities
cases does not yet appear to have been utilized.
4.2.2. The role of the Convention
The Scherk Court expressly refrained from reaching the issue of the Convention's impact on the case, despite the fact that the Convention provides the
internationally agreed criteria for the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
The majority opinion refers to the Convention in two footnotes, while the
minority discusses it at some length [134]. The Court's majority found support
for its opinion in the Convention's ratification rather than in its text:
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from the considerations expressed in
this opinion, would require of its own force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the
present case, we think that this country's adoption and ratification of the Convention and the
passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of
congressional policy consistent with the decision we reach today [135J.

Why did the Court avoid giving an active role to the Convention, when "the
result in Scherk could have been reached more straightforwardly by applying
the terms of the Convention or the [FAA] than by balancing policies" [136]?
The "straightforward" results of the Convention may be precisely why the
Court declined to rely on it in Scherk, though the American Arbitration
Association's amicus brief urged the Court to construe the agreement [137] and
the Scherk dissenters suggested that the agreement was not enforceable under
the Convention [138]. (The dissenters reasoned that since the arbitration
agreement was null and void under section 29(a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, the agreement would fall under the Convention's Article 11(3)
exception for "null and void" agreements [139].) The Court's reluctance to rely
on the Convention seems to reflect a desire to retain flexibility in the securities
arbitration context rather than completely overruling Wilko, as well as to
reflect uncertainty concerning the Convention's retroactive effect and reluctance or inability to refute the minority's Article 11(3) argument.
One commentator suggests that "[tihe Court's minimal reference to the
Convention and the Arbitration Act indicates that it intended to develop a
complex rule for securities transactions with international elements" [140]. The
application of the Convention could otherwise have resulted in the sudden
destruction of the Wilko doctrine and with it the extraterritorial applicability
of the American securities law which the courts had assiduously fostered.
The "international elements" test allows a court to consider a transaction's
adverse impact upon U.S. investors and markets, rather than allowing the
"talisman" of an international contract to excuse "parties to transactions with
many more direct contact with this country than in [Scherk's] case" [141]. The
opinion could be read as an implicit warning that the Wilko doctrine could be
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applied whenever it becomes necessary to protect U.S. investors and markets.
Furthermore, those Justices reluctant to abandon the Wilko policy of protecting securities investors may have argued the balancing test as a compromise
measure in this 5-4 decision.
The events in the Scherk litigation took place before American ratification
of the Convention, and the Court may have doubted its retroactive validity
[142]. Alberto-Culver's brief in Scherk stressed that the intent of Congress was
unclear on the retroactive effect of the Convention's adoption [143]. The
amicus brief filed by the American Arbitration Association, however, asserted
that the Convention was intended to apply retroactively [144]. Recent court
decisions [145] and an authoritative scholar [146] have since affirmed a
retroactive application of the Convention.
The Scherk dissenters' contention that the 1934 Act's statutory conflict with
the arbitration clause renders it unenforceable under Article 11(3) of the
Convention was not expressly refuted by the Scherk majority, but the reasoning of subsequent cases construing Article 11(3) suggests that the argument has
yet to find a receptive audience [147]. The Convention's defenses are to be
construed narrowly [148] and, even where the agreement conflicts with American federal or state statutes, the arbitration agreement is to be enforced unless
enforcement would contravene the forum's "most basic notions of morality
and justice" [149]. Statut of the federal government [150] and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico [1511 have recently failed to satisfy this rigorous
standard, and the disputed arbitration agreements were enforced despite the
conflict [152].
4.3. Consequences of the Scherk reasoning
The Scherk balancing test was intended to provide a flexible rule for
enforcing arbitration in international securities agreements. While one expected problem - unpredictability in the number of "international elements"
required to exempt an arbitration agreement from Wilko - has not yet
appeared, three unexpected results may be noted.
First, the "international elements" emphasis of Scherk has been viewed as
evidencing a strong federal policy in favor of international commercial arbitration in fields other than securities [153].
Second, while Scherk itself did not rely on the Convention, the court's two
footnotes on the Convention have been cited many times in support of
applications of the Convention to non-securities fields [154].
The third consequence of the Scherk reasoning derives from the court's
failure to apply the U.N. Convention to the securities area. Securities arbitration seems to have been tacitly removed from the scope of the Convention by
the Scherk decision. After terming Scherk a "minor exception" to the Wilko
rule, the Fifth Circuit recently explained that the United States Arbitration Act

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol6/iss1/3

K. Ishikurni / Internationalcommercial arbitration

provides "express statutory authorization for arbitration of legal disputes other
than federal securities claims" [155]. The court did not mention that the
provisions in Chapter 2 of the FAA, implementing the Convention, could be
considered "authorization" for securities arbitration in the international context. In Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), the Seventh Circuit considered an
arbitration agreement under Chapter 1 of the FAA, apparently because the
parties did not raise the contention that their securities agreement was an
international one [156]. The court noted that the international elements of the
case supported enforcement of the agreement under Scherk, but did not
mention the Convention [157]. These omissions are comprehensible in the
factual context of these decisions, but in light of the consistent applications of
the Convention to fields other than securities, the hypothesis seems inescapable
that Scherk has effectively removed international securities arbitration from
the scope of the Convention. The result achieved by applying Scherk case law
rather than the Convention may be similar, in that arbitration clauses will
usually be enforced under either approach, but a pure case law approach
violates the obligations of the United States under the Convention.
4.4. The U.N. Convention: The sole test for reconcilingtwo policies
The Scherk approach is one attempt to reconcile two conflicting policies.
The propriety of the Scherk approach, however, is quite questionable in the era
of the Convention. The Convention itself should pose the legal restraints on
the application of the Wilko doctrine in international securities transactions
and the extraterritorial applicability of the federal securities laws [158]. Restraint in the application of domestic laws to international transactions is the
goal of the Convention and the duty of the United States as a Contracting
State.
4.4.1. The meaning of the Convention
The Convention should be the sole and mandatory test for judging
enforceability of an arbitration agreement. Once an agreement to arbitrate falls
within the scope of section 202 of the FAA, Article II of the Convention
requires the courts of the United States to effectuate the policies of the Act and
recognize and enforce the agreement [159].
Courts of a Contracting State may not refuse enforcement on grounds other
than those specified in Article V of the Convention. Article II of the Convention, which declares that to enforce an arbitration agreement is the principal
duty of each contracting state, prohibits Contracting States from hunting for
new grounds for refusal. The listed grounds for refusal to enforce an arbitral
award can, when appropriate, be grounds for refusal to enforce an agreement
to arbitrate as well, since the only justification for the enforcement of an

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

K Ishizumi / Internationalcommercial arbitration

agreement to arbitrate is the necessity of protecting the development of awards
capable of enforcement [160].
Recent court decisions [161] have relied upon the Convention as the sole
and mandatory test for judging enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate and
of an award. In Fotochrome v. Copal, Limited, the district and appellate courts'
judgments reversing a decision of a bankruptcy judge were rendered pursuant
to the terms of the Convention. The Second Circuit's decision reconciled the
policies embodied in the federal Bankruptcy Act [162) with the policy favoring
international commercial arbitration. Fotochrome, a New York corporation,
fell into dispute with Copal, a Japanese corporation, and the two parties
proceeded to arbitration in Tokyo. Fotochrome filed a Chapter XI arrangement in a United States court before the Tokyo arbitration was completed. The
bankruptcy judge issued the usual order staying all proceedings by creditors,
including pending arbitrations, but the Arbitration Association in Tokyo
issued an award in favor of Copal. The bankruptcy judge refused to recognize
the award and ruled that he had power to rehear the issues of liability de novo.
The district, court found that the Convention compelled it to conclude that
"American corporations facing imminently unfavorable arbitrations abroad
may not file for chapter XI arrangements here to avoid final and binding
arbitral judgment abroad", even though "the result might somewhat disturb
the draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Act" [163]. The Second Circuit in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Company Limited affirmed the district court's decision on
the basis of the Convention, but did not agree that the Bankruptcy Act
conflicted with the Convention [164].
The Third Circuit in McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., reversed
the lower court: "It was error to deny the motion for a stay [of foreign
attachment pending arbitration] in disregard of the [Convention" (165). Relying on Article II of the Convention, the court reasoned, "There is nothing
discretionary about [A]rticle 11(3) of the Convention. It states that district
courts shall ... refer the parties to arbitration" [166]. In Antco Shipping Co. v.
SidermarS.p.A. [167], the court granted the petition to compel arbitration on
the basis of the Convention. The court stated that "[w]hile the court in Scherk
did not base its decision squarely on the Convention" [168], the defendant's
direct reliance upon the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA "is well
founded" [169].
The Convention should establish a restraint on the Wilko doctrine and the
extraterritorial applicability of the federal securities laws. Although the Wilko
doctrine has some rationale, the ambit of the non-waiverability provisions in
federal securities acts has been retrenched by the Convention. Once an
agreement to arbitrate-securities disputes falls within the Convention, it should
not be subject to those provisions.
The Convention formulates a restriction on extraterritorial applicability. In
so doing, the Convention rejected the "adverse impact test". The mere ex-
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istence of harmful consequences for American citizens is not a ground under
the Convention to fail to enforce an arbitration agreement. The Convention
codifies the points of compromise of conflicting interests of each contracting
state, and balances their interests.
4.2.2. The tests of the Convention
The Convention should be applied broadly, and its defenses should be
construed narrowly. In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci~tj Gin~ral
de l'Industriedu Papier (RAKTA) [170], the Second Circuit found no merit in
the defendant's contention that enforcement of the award would violate the
public policy of the United States and concluded that "the Convention's
public policy defense should be construed narrowly" [171]. The court urged
reasons for a narrow reading of the Convention's exceptions: its
"enforcement-facilitating thrust" [172], and "the case law under the similar
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act" [173]. "[E]very indication is that the
Untied States, in acceding to the Convention, meant to subscribe to this
supranational emphasis" [174].
The narrow construction doctrine of Parsonshas been supported by subsequent cases [175]. For example, the New Jersey district court in Biotronik v.
Medford Medical Instrument Company, in applying the narrow construction
doctrine, commented that "considerations of international reciprocity furnish
an additional reason to construe defenses narrowly" [176].
Once an agreement falls within the Convention, it should in principle,
escape the Wilko doctrine and the extraterritorial application of federal
securities laws. The determination of whether an agreement falls under the
convention is therefore the first test for circumscribing the Wilko doctrine.
Section 202 of the FAA provides the test [177]. First, any arbitration
agreement arising out of a legal relationship which is between a citizen or a
corporation of the United States and a citizen or corporation of a foreign state
falls under the Convention. The test is straightforward and no discretionary
element exists in securities transactions [178]. Thus, the Scherk agreement
automatically would fall under the Convention. Second, even an agreement
arising out of a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United
States falls under the Convention if it involves a "reasonable relation with ...
foreign states" [179]. If a securities contract between two Americans involved a
"reasonable relationship with foreign states", the contract could fall under the
Convention and avoid the Wilko doctrine. An arbitral award must be a foreign
award, however, if it is to be enforced in the United States under the
Convention [180]. Thus, an agreement to arbitrate in the United States would
not fall under the Convention if enforcement were sought in the United States.
Articles 11(l) and V(2) (a) provide the nonarbitrability defense [1811. The
narrow construction doctrine must also govern in determining "a subject
matter incapable of settlement by arbitration". The Second Circuit stated in
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Parsons:
The mere fact that an issue of national interest may incidentally figure into the resolution of a
breach of contract claim does not make the dispute nonarbitrable. Rather, certain categories of
claims may be nonarbitrable because of the special national interest vested in their resolution (182.

The court's opinion is, in other words, that the test for nonarbitrability is not of
an ad hoc nature. The Scherk approach, which is based on an ad hoc
examination of "international elements", may be an improper test under the
Convention.
The structure of Article II(1) indicates that categories of claims are nonarbitrable. Valid agreements to arbitrate present and future disputes are
enforceable under the Article, subject to the defense of nonarbitrability. If a
subject-matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration, then it must be
nonarbitrable both as to present and future disputes. It is the intrinsic
suitability for settlement by arbitration of categories of claims which determines the- availability of the nonarbitrability defense. Because the parties to
a securities transaction may appropriately agree to arbitrate a present dispute,
this defense may not properly be asserted in any securities dispute.
Articles 11(3) and V(l) (a) provide the defense of invalidity, which may be
invoked when the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed, or when the agreement is not valid. The governing law and the
burden of proof provide procedural limitations on this defense. The Article V
defense defines the governing law as "the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, ... the law of the country where
the award was made ... " [183] and places the burden of proof on the party

against whom the award is invoked. The same rules have been deemed
applicable in the Article tI defense [1841. For example, in an international
arbitration agreement where the parties are from nations other than the forum
state and the forum's law governs, neither party can raise the defense that the
agreement is invalid under this country's law [185].
The narrow construction doctrine should guide the definition of "invalidity"
of an agreement. The court in Antco Shipping Co. found that the party resisting
enforcement must show that "the essence of the obligation or remedy is
prohibited by a pertinent statute or other declaration of public policy" [186].
In other words, invalidity means that "public policy as embodied in a statute
forbids the performance which is the subject of dispute ... " [187]. Under this
reasoning one could conclude that an allegation of fraud, undue influence,
overweening bargaining power, or coercion does not constitute a defense, since
such an allegation attacks the process of agreement between the parties on the
obligation, not the obligation itself. An example of successful exercise of this
defense could be where the parties knowingly concluded a contract "in
restraint of trade or commerce" [188], and upon the breach of the contract by
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one party, the other party asked for the performance of the contract in
arbitration.
The public policy defense provided in Article V(2) is perhaps the Convention's most controversial. The court may refuse enforcement on the basis of an
arbitrary test of "public policy". The Parsons decision circumscribed this
defense and has been consistently upheld by subsequent court decisions. The
Parsonscourt also noted that adherence to the Convention is itself a significant
public policy of the United States [189].
The Second Circuit in Parsonsheld that "[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral
awards may be denied ... only where enforcement would violate the forum
state's most basic notions of morality andjustice" [190]. The court indicated its
firm intention to confine "the public policy" to the fundamental public
policies of a state. The economic aspect of "the most basic morality and
justice" would presumably constitute the most fundamental philosophy underlying a state's economic structure. Nonarbitrability and nonwaiverability of
10b-5 claims in federal securities issues should not be considered to constitute
"the most basic morality and justice" [191].
One commentator suggests that a difference of bargaining power of the
parties could be an effective public policy defense [192]. Some differential in
bargaining power is usual in international transactions [193]. Furthermore, the
unlimited affirmance of this defense would be detrimental to the Convention.
For a "difference of bargaining power" to become the defense of "the most
basic morality and justice", mere superior bargaining power is of itself insufficient. As the dissenting opinion in Wilko suggested [194], a difference in
bargaining power can be the defense only when it reaches the level of
"unconscionability" [195]. Overweening bargaining power is most likely where
the American party is an unsophisticated individual and the foreign party is a
large corporation, a situation that might invoke the Wilko doctrine.
An allegation of fraud or coercion may constitute a public policy defense.
The Supreme Court in dictum in Scherk stated that "presumably the type of
fraud alleged here could be raised, under Art. V of the Convention, in
challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award ... " [196]. The Court noted
that the defense should be allowed only if "the inclusion of [the arbitration]
clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion" [197]. Two circuit
courts have recently built upon a Scherk footnote encouraging unified standards in the enforcement of awards [198], and concluded that the "null and
void" clause "must be interpreted to encompass only those situations - such as
fraud, mistake, duress and waiver - that can be applied neutrally on an
international scale" [1991.
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5. Conclusion
It has been twelve years since the United States' accession to the U.N.
Convention. United States courts should abandon the vestiges of the common
law's distrust of arbitration and end the zealous extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws. International commercial arbitration is an indispensable
mechanism in modern international transactions.
The Convention has presented the best method of reconciling the conflict
between national policies in favor of protecting a country's own citizens and
markets and the international accord as to the desirability of commercial
arbitration. The U.S. courts should leave behind the Wilko doctrine and the
Scherk test, and adopt the Convention as the sole test of the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.
The Convention will be most effective if the courts of all Contracting States
apply it broadly, and construe its defenses narrowly. To further effect a
smooth internationalization of capital markets and a harmonious operation of
transnational securities transactions, perhaps the international community
should study and develop a supranational regulatory scheme for international
securities transactions.
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Bulgaria. Canada (Ontario), the United States (the Federal Arbitration Act. New York and
American Arbitration Association), Mongolia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of
China. Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Pakistan and Japan can be Tound
in K. Morii, Kokusatshojichusai 333-568 app. (1970).
[9] Contini, supra note 5. at 284. For a detailed study of arbitration systems of world nations.
see K. Morii, Kokusatshojichusai, supra note 8, at 123-242.
f10] Contini, supra note 5. at 285.
[II] Geneva [rptpcp; pm Arbotratopm Clauses, done Dept. 24, 1923,27 L.N.TS. 157 (effective
July 28, 1924) (concerned mostly with the validity of agreements to arbitrate future disputes
between the parties to the contract). The United States did not join the 32 nations ratifying the
Treaty.
[121 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done Sept. 26, 1927. 92
L.N.T.S. 301 (effective July 25, 1929) (requiring that an arbitral award be recognized as binding
and enforceable in accordance with the national law agreed to by the parties instead of the law of
the forum state).
[131 Contini, supra note 5, at 290. For the exhaustive analysis of the reasons for the failure of
these two Geneva treaties, see Nussbaum, Treaties on Commercial Arbitration - A Test of
International Private-Law Legislation, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 219. 234-244 (1942). See also Lorenzen.
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Commercial Arbitration- Enforcement of ForeignAwards, 45 Yale L.J. 39 (1935).
(14] Convention on the Settlement of investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Aug. 27, 1965,[1966] 1 U.S.T. 1271, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter
cited as CSID]. 68 nations including the United States have ratified CSID. It has been said that
CSID is aimed at Latin America which has been antagonistic to the use of international
commercial arbitration. Mirabito, supra note 5, at 484. For a study of CSID based on an actual
court decision, see Arbitration Under the Auspices of the InternationalCentrefor the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica,Inc. v. Government of Jamaica,17 Hay. Int'l L.J. 90 (1976). The purpose and background
of CSID are well explained in its preamble: "Considering the need for international cooperation
for economic development, and the role of private international investment..." and "recognizing
that while ... disputes tin connection with such investment] would usually be subject to national
legal processes, international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases ...
the
contracting states have attached "particular importance to the availability of facilities for international conciliation or arbitration..." 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 160. CSID has established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes under the auspices of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). Articles I and 2 of CSID. Id. As to
recognition and enforcement of awards in a contracting state. CSID states that "[e]ach Contracting
State shall recognize an award ... as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by
that award ... as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a
federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide
that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent
state." Article 54. Id. at 194. Thus, it is required that an award have the same effect as a final
judgment in a contracting state.
[15] The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. (5) & (6) (1947).
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (effective Jan. 1, 1948). GATT' adopts the conciliation
mechanism as a means for dispute settlement between the contracting states. Mirabito, supra note
5, at 484-485.
[16] European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, adopted April 30, 1958,
Europ. T.S. No. 23. Unfortunately, this Convention has loose enforcement rules. "Failure to
comply with a judgment of the International Court of Justice or an Arbitral Tribunal may be
appealed to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which may then, by a two-thirds
majority of the representatives, make recommendations to ensure compliance." A Dictionary of
Arbitrationand its Terms 88 (K. Seide, ed. 1970).
[17] The Convention, supra note 3, was adopted in 1958 with 25 nations signing that year. The
United States signed in 1970.
[181 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done April 21, 1961, 484
U.N.T.S. 349 [hereinafter cited as ECICA]. ECICA applies to arbitration agreements in relation to
international trade between European contracting countries. Article I. Id. ECICA includes
provisions for organization of arbitration (Article IV. Id. at 366), the choice of law applicable to
the arbitration (Article VII. Id. at 374), the setting aside of an arbitral award (Article IX. Id. at
374) and other procedural rules such as rules of governing the place of arbitration and the
appointment of arbitrators.
[19] Resolution 31/98, adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1976; United
Nations, Uncitral Arbitration Rules (1977) 31 U.N. Gaor, supp. (No. 17) 32-50, U.N. Dec.
A/31/17 (1976). The text of the Rules can be found in 31 U.N. GAOR, Id., at 34-50. The
preamble of the Rules states:
The General Assembly,
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Recognizing the value of arbitration as a method of settling disputes arising in the context of
international commercial relations; Being convinced that the establishment of rules for ad hoc
arbitration that are acceptable in countries with different legal, social and economic systems would
significantly contribute to the development of harmonious international economic relations;

1. Recommends the use of the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in the settlement of disputes arising in the context of international commercial
relations, particularly by reference to the Arbitration Rules in commercial contracts;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the widest possible distribution of the Arbitration
Rules. Id. at 5.
The Rules will be invoked when the parties to a contract have agreed that disputes shall be referred
to arbitration under the Rules. Id. Article 1, at 6. The Rules mainly deal with procedural aspects of
arbitration.
[20] ICC clauses have been "inserted in literally thousands of agreements - far more
frequently so than the number of actually conducted arbitrations would allow the uninitiated to
assume" (footnotes omitted). Cohn. The Rules of Arbitration of the InternationalChamber of
Commerce, 14 Int'l & Com. L. Q. 132, 171 (1965).
[21] Tindall, supra note 6, at 69.
[22] Mirabito, supra note 5, at 480; Tindall, supra note 6, at 71.
To have the ICC take jurisdiction of a dispute, the parties should provide an arbitration clause
in their original contract. Even after a dispute has arisen, business parties with no arbitration
clause can still select arbitration under the ICC rules. Tindall, supra note 6, at 69.
[231 Tindall, supra note 6, at 70.
[241 See Mirabito, supra note 5, at 482. For a study of the procedural aspects of the ICC, see
Cohn. supra note 20.
[25] Laymen often doubt whether arbitrators have the ability to handle specific technical fields.
This doubt, however, is groundless. "At the hearings the arbitrator will listen to the parties'
positions, then the witnesses, and can himself appoint technical experts to investigate and report
upon complicated issues." Furthermore, there is a double-checking system: "When the arbitrator
or arbitrators have reached a conclusion, their ruling, an 'award' must then be approved by the
Court of Arbitration." Tindall, supra note 6, at 70. Of course, arbitration will not be stopped by
the defaulting non-appearance of one party. Once the arbitration has commenced, an award will be
rendered even if one party does not participate. In this sense, "arbitration is [a] compulsory"
procedure. Mirabito, supra note 5, at 482.
[26] Eisemann, Arbitrationunderthe InternationalChamberof Commerce Rules, 15 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 726, 734-35 (1966).
[27] Id. at 735; Tindall, supra note 6, at 71; Mirabito, supra note 5, at 482.
[28] For the English common law doctrine, see, e.g., Kill V. Hollister, I Wilson 129, 95 Eng.
Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746). See also Mirabito, supra note 5, at 472; Corbin, Enforceabilityof Contractual
Agreements for Dispute Settlement Abroad International Trade Arbitration: A Road to Worldwide
Cooperation 251, 253 & n. 18; Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration - Internationaland Interstate
Aspects, 43 Yale L.J. 716 (1934). For the U.S. common law doctrine see, e.g., Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n o. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1897); Kuhnhold V. Compagnie Ginirale
Transatlantique,251 F. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
[29] Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1976).
[30] In 1921 New York adopted an arbitration statute. N.Y. Civ. Prac. §§1448-69 (McKinney
1963). By 1967, 22 states had followed New York's lead, with arbitration statutes of their own.
Comment, International Commercial Arbitration Under the United Nations Convention and the
Amended FederalArbitration Statute, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 441, 444 n. 8 (1972).
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[31] 9 U.S.C. §§2-4. See also 9 U.S.C. §9.
[32] See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition of ForeignArbitralAwards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049, 1051 (1961). By 1975 the United States
had concluded an arbitration clause with the following countries: Japan, Korea, the Republic of
China, Iran, Israel, Haiti, Colombia, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Denmark, and the Netherlands. Mirabito supra note 5, at 479 n. 56.
[33] Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946. United States-the Republic of China 63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (effective Nov. 30, 1948).
[34] Id. at Article VI, para. 4, 63 Stat. 1306.
[35] Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United States-Ireland, I
U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 (effective Sept. 14, 1950).
[36] Id. at Article X, at I U.S.T. 785, 794.
[37] Quigleya supra note 32, at 1052 & n. 22.
[38] Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, Untied States-Japan. 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct. 30, 1953). See Article IV, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. at
2067-68.
[39] Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Federal
Republic of Germany. 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (effective July 14, 1956). See, id. at Article
VI.
[40] Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, March 27, 1956, United States-The
Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, 1957).
[41] Id. at Article V, para. 2; 8 U.S.T. at 2049-50.
[42] Mirabito, supra note 5, at 479, 481. See also Quigley, supra note 32, at 1053-54.
[43] See, e.g., Landegger v. Bayeriche Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank, 357 F. Supp. 692
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Von Engelbrechten v. Galvanoi& Nevy Bros., 59 Misc. 2d 721, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 239
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969), aff'd, 61 Misc. 2d 959, 307 N.Y.S. (26 381) (Sup. Ct. 1970).
[44] Contini, supra note 5, at 291.
[45] Aksen, American Arbitration Association Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States
Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. Rev. 1, 4 (1971).
[46] Mirabito, supra note 5, at 485-86 n. 100.
[47] Article I provides in pertinent part:
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also
apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the States where their recognition
and enforcement are sought.
[48] Article II, which deals with agreements to arbitrate, provides in pertinent part:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The court of a Contracting State ... shall at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed.
[49] Quigley, supra note 32, at 1060.
[50] Contini, supra note 5, at 296. See also Quigley, supra note 32, at 1064.
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[511 Quigley. supra note 2. at 1060.
[521 3 Sw. U.L. Rev., supra note 45, at 13.
[531 Id.
[541 ABA proposed amendments to Titles 9 and 28 U.S.C.. S. Exec. E., 90th Cong. 2d Sess. at i
(1968).
[551 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (1970).
[561 Id. §202.
1571 Id.
[58] See U.C.C. §1-501(1) & Official Comment.
[591 Section 203 gives original jurisdiction over an action or proceeding failing under the
Convention to the federal district court. 9 U.S.C. §203 (1970). Section 204 deals with venue. 9
U.S.C. §204 (1970). Section 205 provides that "[W]here the subject matter of an action or
proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration agreement or award .... the defendant
... may ... remove such action or proceeding to" a federal district court. 9 U.S.C. §205 (1970).
(60] Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 520 n. 15.
161] Id.
[62] 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
[63] See, e.g., 592 F.2d 414; 573 F.2d 283; 548 F.2d 112.
[64] The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States supplies one basis for
"the adverse impact test". Section 18 of the Restatement states:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a cime or tort
under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii)
the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18 (1965).
[65] 405 F.2d 200, affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
cert.dented, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
[66] Id. at 206.
[671 Arbitration Clauses in InternationalContractsand the Extraterritorial Reach of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in Light of Scherk v. Alberio-Culver Co., 26 Syracuse L. Rev. 995, 1005
(1975).
[681 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub non?.
Bersch v. Anderson. 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); S.E.C. v. United Financial Group, 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Inc., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
[691 Bersch, 423 U.S. 1018.
[70] 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
171] Id. at 526.
[72] "It is indeed questionable whether Congress intended the Exchange Act to apply to a
foreign transaction involving an American plaintiff, where the only ties to the United States are a
few letters and telephone calls." 26 Syracuse L Rev.. supra note 67, at 10008.
[73] Bersch. 519 F.2d 974.
[741 Id. at 991.
[751 Id. at 992.
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[76] Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale
L.J. 639 (1954).
[77] The Bremen 1. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
[781 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
[79] See, e.g., Section 12(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §771(l) (1970); Section II of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970).
[80] See, e.g., Section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 16 U.S.C. §771(2) (1970).
[81] 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
[82] Id. at 438.
[83] Id. at 431.
[84] Id. at 435.
[851 Id.
[861 Id. at 436.
[87] 15 U.S.C. §77n, supra note 2.
[88] Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Starknman v. Seroussi, 377 F.
Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Laupheimer v. McDonnell&Co., 500 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1974); Fischerv.
New York Stock Exchange, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep: 95,416,
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
[89] 377 F. Supp. at 524.
[90] 500 F.2d at 26.
[911 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1976).
[92] Sibley o. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977);
Miley v. Oppenheimer and Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981); Dickinson v. Heinold
Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
[93] 661 F.2d at 644.
[94] 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
[95] 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th Cir. 1981).
[96] 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979).
[97] Beckman Instruments, Inc . Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (patent claims); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith,
431 F. Supp. 271, 275-78 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (fiduciary claims); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978) (antitrust claims); Allegaert v. Perot, 548
F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,432 U.S. 910 (1978) (bankruptcy claims).
[98] 346 U.S. at 440.
[99] Id. (emphasis added).
[100] Id. at 435.
[1011 451 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1971).
[102] 287 F. Supp. 766, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
[103] [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. 92,886, affd mem., 36 App. Div.
2d 1036, 321 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1971).
[104] 453 F.2d 1209, 1212-14 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1973).
[105] 551 F.2d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 1977).
[106] Id. at 636 n. 13.
[107] Fischer o. New York Stock Exchange, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. at 199,102. See also Himebaugh v. Smith, 476 F. Supp. 502, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
[108] 345 F. Supp. 14, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

[109] Id.
[110]
[I11]
[112]
[113]

See supra section 2.3.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 508.
The ICC eventually issued an award in favor of Alberto-Culver, which was enforced by
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the Eastern District of Illinois in 1978. Alberto-Culver v. Fritz Scherk, No. 71-144, slip op. (N.D.
Ill. July 12, 1978).
[114] 407 U.S. at 1.
[115] 417 U.S. at 519.
[116] Zapata Off-Shore Company v. m/s Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 1970), affd on
rehearing 446 F. 2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
[117] The Bremen. 407 U.S. at 9.
[1181 Id.
[1191 Id.at 13-14.
11201 Id.at 13 n. 15; cf. Intertrade v.m/t Stolt Pride, No. 81-6954, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. June 22.
1982) (where site of arbitration is designated but agreement is silent on governing law, arbitrators
must determine what law applies and need not apply law of situs of arbitration).
[121] 407 U.S. at 13 n. 15.
[122] Justice Douglas criticized this analogy in his dissent, 417 F.2d at 532 n. 11.as follows:
"The enforcement of arbitration clauses effectively deprives a party of procedural safeguards such
as due process and judicial review, while enforcement of a forum-selection clause leaves such rights
whole."
[123] 417 U.S. at 515.
[124] Id. at 518.
[125] Id.at 516-17.
[126] Id. at n. 11.
[127] Id. at 516.
[128] Id. at 517 n. 1i.
[129] Id.
[1301 Newman v. Shearson, Hammill& Co., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tx. 1974).
[1311 Weissbuch v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith. Inc., 558 F.2d 831 at 834 (domestic, so
Scherk did not apply); cf. Wahbe Tamari & Sons Co. v.Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 565 F.2d 1194,
1200 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 905 (1978) (given international elements, Scherk is
relevant).
[132] Manscott v. Prescott,Ball& Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979).
[133] Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Associates, Inc., 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th Cir. 1981).
[134] 417 U.S. at 519 n. 14, 520 n. 15, 529.
[135] Id. at 520 n. 15.
[1361 InternationalArbitration,16Harv. Int'l LJ. 705, 717 (1975).
[137] Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Arbitration Association, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,
417 U.S. 520 (1974).
[138] 417 U.S. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[139] Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 146-151.
[140] 16 Harv. Int'l LJ., supra note 135, at 717 (footnotes omitted).
[141] 417 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[142] 26 Syracuse L. Rev.. supra note 67, at 1012.
[143] Opposition Brief, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, at 21 n. 10.
[144] Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Arbitration Association at 14 n. 6., Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver,417 U.S. at 520.
[145] In FertilizerCorporationof India v. I.D.I. Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 952 (S.D.
Ohio 1981), the court suggested that if the arbitral award itself is issued after 1970, even if the
agreement date is earlier, the Convention applies. This suggests that where the action is brought to
enforce the agreement to arbitrate, rather than the award itself, the first date of attempted
enforcement should determine the applicability of the convention. See also Fotochrome, Inc. v.
Copal Company, Lvmite, 517 F.2d 512, 515 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1975) (agreed with lower court that the
Convention controls arbitration agreements and enforcement actions commenced after its effective
date).
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[146] Quigley, Convention on ForeignArbitralAwards,58 A.B.AJ. 821, 822 (1972).
147] See infra notes 169-175, 182-187 and accompanying texts.
[148] Parsons,508 F.2d at 974.
[149] Id. While Parsonsconstrued section V, on enforcement of an arbitral award, it has been
applied also to enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under section 11(3). Ledee v. Cerainche
Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (Ist Cir. 1982); Intertrade v. mIt Stolt Pride,No. 81-6954. slip op. n. 4
(S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1982).
[150] Intertrade, No. 81-6954, slip op. (since federal statute was subsequently limited in
duration by Congress, it cannot be deemed "most basic notion of morality and justice").
[151] Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (Puerto Rican statute prohibiting arbitration of subject matter
outside the Commonwealth did not make agreement void).
[152] See also Fotochrome,Inc., 377 F. Supp. at 31 (conflict between enforcement of award and
Bankruptcy Act would not void award under Convention), affd on othergrounds. 517 F.2d at 517.
[153] See, e.g., Becker Autoradio USA, Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk Gmnbh, 585 F.2d 39,44 (3d
Cir. 1978); FertilizerCorporationof India, 517 F. Supp. at 955.
[154] See, e.g., I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Brothers, 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981);
BeckerAutoradio USA, Inc., 585 F.2d at 43; Hanes Corporationv. Millard,531 F.2d 585, 597 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
[155] Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Associates, Inc., 642 F.2d at 792.
[156] Tamar! v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 565 F.2d at 1197, 1200 n. 11.
[157] Id.
[158] For example, had an arbitration agreement been in effect in Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d 215,
Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326, or Travis, 473 F.2d 513, the courts would almost have been unable to find
jurisdiction to reach the merits because in the context of these cases such agreements to arbitrate
fall squarely within the scope of the Convention. See also 16 Harv. Int'l L.J., supra note 134, at
719.
[159] See I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc., 636 F.2d at 77 (reversing district court's finding that the
FAA confers discretion in compelling international arbitration).
[1601 Quigley, supra note 32, at 1064.
[1611 See supra note 152.
[162] 11 U.S.C. §I, et. seq. (1970).
[163] 377 F.Supp. at 31.
[164] 517 F.2d at 517.
[165] 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974).
(166] Id.
[167] 417 F.Supp. at 207.
[168] Id. at 214.
(169] Id. at 215; see supra note 153.
[170] 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
[171] Id. at 974.
[172] Id. at 976.
[173] Id.
[174] Id.
[175] Ledee, 684 F.2d 184; Fotochrome,Ina, 517 F.2d at 516; Intertrade,No. 81-6954, slip op.;
Antoco Shipping Co., 417 F. Supp. at 216, 217; Biotronik v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415
F.Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
[176] 415 F.Supp. at 139.
[177] See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
[178] While courts have discretion to determine whether a relationship is considered "commercial", a contract involving a securities transaction is deemed "commercial".
[179] See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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[180] Article 1(1) of the Convention. See supra note 47.
[1811 See supra text accompanying notes 47. 51 and 52.
11821 508 F.2d at 975 (emphasis in original).
11831 Article V(l)(a) of the Convention.
1184] Antco Shipping Co., 417 F.Supp. at 215 (in Article II proceeding, burden
of proof is on
the party resisting enforcement).
11851 Cf.Intertrade, No. 81-6954. slip op. (where agreement designated New York
as arbitration forum but was silent on choice of law, and arbitrators found that U.S. law
did not govern.
claim of conflict between U.S. law and the agreement's payment clause would
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